This paper presents two views of the European sovereign debt crisis. The first is that the South in the euro zone has been fiscally irresponsible, and has failed to implement supply-side policies such as liberalizing labor markets and the market for services. The second view holds that the crisis reflects a deep divide between the external surpluses of the North and external deficits of the South. Basic stylized facts raise some doubt about the validity of the thesis that the debt crisis in the Eurozone is driven primarily by fiscal fragility in the South. A relatively simple model shows how poor fundamentals can create a debt problem independently of fiscal responsibility. The empirical analysis of the determinants of government bond yield spreads relative to Germany suggests that both views in fact provide useful insights into the roots of the current sovereign crisis. Fiscal fragility and external imbalances explain a significant share of the widening spreads since the onset of the global financial crisis. However, differences in labor productivity growth between North and South assume a much relevant role since the Greek crisis erupted in 2010.
Introduction
This paper tries to answer the following three inter-related questions: Why is the speculative attack against sovereign debt taking place in the euro area (EA) in the aftermath of the financial crisis of [2008] [2009] ? Why is that attack primarily focused on the South, and not on the North of the EA? Why is such a crisis not occurring outside the EA?
The current policy debate in the EA is predominantly centered on whether the ongoing fiscal austerity should be continued during depressed economic times. We can identify at least three different views in this debate: fiscal austerity in the South of the EA (simply the South) is necessary to resolve the debt crisis; fiscal austerity can make the debt crisis worse rather than better; and, an intermediate position, that the austerity measures need to be timed rather carefully.
The first view is the "German" view: fiscal austerity is essential to reduce the yield spreads of the government debt of the South relative to that of the "safe"
German government debt, restore credibility in the South's ability to honor its debt, and lessen the risk of the South exiting the euro. The alternative of inflating away the problem by transforming the European Central Bank (ECB) into a lender of last resort to governments is not only unacceptable to the North, but violates the Treaty of the European Union; see Neumann (2012) . The second view, the Keynesian, is that fiscal austerity is counter-productive, given the size of the fiscal multipliers, marginal tax rates and expected long-term growth rates. Fiscal austerity, rather than reduce budget deficits and debt-to-GDP ratios, may actually exacerbate the markets' doubts about government solvency; see DeLong and Summers (2012) . The third view accepts the necessity of fiscal austerity but not under bad economic times, in other words the implementation of fiscal correction must take place when conditions warrant it; see Corsetti (2012) and IMF (2012) .
Until recently, relatively little has been said in the policy debate about the euro-area crisis being just as much the result of external imbalances as of fiscal profligacy. In a sovereign country, inter-regional imbalances would pose no problem to the stability of the monetary union. But in the euro area they do. There are two reasons for this.
The first is that a monetary union needs the support of a significant centralized budget to absorb transitory, idiosyncratic shocks to individual member economies; in other words a fiscal union (Kenen 1969) . In a monetary union, monetary policy can only stabilize aggregate shocks if they affect all members of the union equally. Real exchange-rate adjustments to idiosyncratic shocks, instead, must operate through changes in regional prices and wages. The fact that prices and wages are sluggish makes the adjustment process slow and leads to excessively long disequilibria in the output and labor markets. Therefore, it falls to fiscal policy to play the role of equilibrating regional differences in the fluctuations of output and employment (Fratianni and von Hagen 1992, ch. 8) . Inadequate centralized fiscal instruments expose a monetary union to prolonged spells of regional economic disparities and, as a result, undermine the proper functioning of the union. It was in light of these considerations that the Delors Report (1989: 89) The call for a sizable centralized fiscal budget to stabilize transitory regional shocks in an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is an old one, and goes back to the MacDougall Report (Commission of the EC 1977) which estimated that a budget of about five percent of the Community's GNP would be required for a viable EMU.
The same report also indicated that central governments tend to redistribute resources among regions in a permanent way. For example, between 1971 and 1973 , the poorer regions in the South of Italy received net public finance inflows averaging between 7.8 and 28 percent of their gross regional product. At the same time, their regional current-account deficits varied between 14.8 and 42.3 percent. In contrast, the relatively rich regions in the North had net public finance outflows between 4.4 and 11.1 percent, compared with current account surpluses of 10.9 to 15.3 percent (Commission of the EC 1977: 33) . 2 The second reason why national imbalances may undermine the EA is that speculative attacks against individual members of the monetary union cannot be ruled out (Garber 1999) . By contrast, speculative attacks against regions of a sovereign country can be ruled out. The argument goes as follows. The euro area has both a centralized monetary authority, the ECB, and national central banks (NCB) . The fixity of the exchange rate among member countries is guaranteed by unlimited credit granted to each NCB through Target2, the online real-time payment system through which intra-euro area transactions are settled. These transactions arise from crossborder flows of goods and services, financial transactions or transfer of money (bank deposits) from one member country to another. If member countries had fixed exchange rates but different currencies, these cross-border transactions would have to be settled with international reserves. The common currency and the Target 2 mechanism have eliminated the need for such reserves. But an essential condition for the smooth operation of the euro area is that each NCB must have free access to credit through Target2. On the other hand, if there is "skepticism that a strong currency NCB will provide through Target2 unlimited credit in euros to the weak NCBs," sparked by "[a] large cross-border capital movement [that] may occur because of misplaced doubt about the continuation of a country in the monetary union, fear of a default on its bonds, or problems in its financial system that cause a bank run," then a precondition exists for a speculative attack (Garber 1999:211-12 Figure 1 ). At the end of 2011, the 2 The Italian redistribution of public resources from the North supplemented the inadequate capital inflows to South. In the years 1970-72 private net inflows, intermediated by banks and largely subsidized by government, accounted for 14.2 percent of the South GDP against a current-account deficit equal to 23.4 percent of the area's GDP. Such a situation has persisted to the present day. Longrun sustainability of the inter-regional current-account imbalances in the Italian monetary union was guaranteed not only by inter-regional flows of capital (both private and public) but also of labor: from 1951 to 1981, 25 per cent of the population has emigrated from the less developed Italian regions. On these issues see, among others, Tamagna and Qualeatti (1978) , Alessandrini (1989) , Galli (1990), and De Bonis et al. 2010. German credit balance had increased by more than €100 billion to a reported total of nearly €1tn, while Italy had rapidly accumulated a deficit position of close to €200 billion (Bornhorst and Mody 2012, Figure 1 ). Wollmershaeuser (2011) and European Economic Advisory Group (2012, ch. 2) claim that these imbalances represent a quasi-fiscal action by creditor NCBs (the North) in favor of debtor NCBs (the South) and are qualitatively not different from the assistance that the South already receives through the European Financial Stability Facility.
3 In Germany, this issue is becoming politicized and gives additional credence to the point raised by
Garber: the very fact that a discussion is taking place about ways to curtail or make these Target2 debit balances more costly raises doubts about the availability of unlimited credit access in the Target2 system and the possibility, remote as it may be, of a speculative currency attack on the euro -or, more likely, on the debt of the debtor economies.
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In sum, EA is structurally fragile; a fragility that was exposed by the financial crisis and government actions to rescue their banking systems. Investors' fears about this weak structure has manifested itself by attacking the euro through the government debt market. While these speculative attacks may reflect genuine concerns about the unsustainability of debt in the South, the deep divide between the external surplus of the North and the deficits in the South cannot be dismissed as a potential trigger mechanism for the debt crisis and its resistance to fiscal therapy. This stubborn resistance may well reflect an inadequate transfer mechanism that is normally present in sovereign states, disequilibrating real exchange rate movements, and low economic growth. These are old problems; but they have not been recognized sufficiently by the recent literature or policy practice. As a result, the present regime of fiscal austerity appears to be more a cure of a symptom than of the cause of the euro crisis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the second section we present some stylized facts of the sovereign debt crisis, facts that cast some doubt on the view that the sovereign debt crisis has been driven primarily by the lack of fiscal discipline in the South. The third lays out the two interpretations of the crisis and the related literature. Section four provides a general framework for analyzing an excess debt problem. Section five develops and tests an empirical of the determinants of sovereign yield spreads in the euro area. The critical result is that fiscal fragility and external imbalances explain a significant share of the widening spreads in the euro area since the onset of the global financial crisis. Differences in labor productivity and growth rates between the North and the South have also assumed a more important role since the Greek crisis erupted in 2010. Conclusions are drawn in the last section.
Stylized Facts
In this section we present some stylized facts of the sovereign debt crisis. We start with an examination of the yields on 10-year government bonds of Greece, Ireland, for € 530 billion are widely believed to have helped the decline in spreads that has taken place from those peaks all the way down to the end of our sample period. The last trading data on Greek bonds is February 29, 2012. Greece averted default after a large majority of private creditors agreed to a large debt haircut on March 9, 2012.
The extraordinary rise in GIPSI's bond yields stands in sharp contrast to the decline of US, UK, and Japanese bond yields -right panel of Figure 1 -as well as to German bonds. The German yield declines steadily from its high point of 4.7 percent reached in the middle of 2008 down to 1.8 percent at the end of March, 2012. US and UK yields drop from around 5 percent in 2007, to approximately 2 percent in the first quarter of 2012; Japanese yields drop from the 2 to the 1 percent range over the same period. These are dramatic contrasts that this paper needs to explain.
Differences in inflation expectations, or an expected exchange rate depreciation of the euro relative to the dollar, are not likely explanations of the phenomenon in question. If they were, one would have observed significant differences between the German yields and the US, UK and Japanese yields. In fact, the differences of the German yields from UK and US yields are negligible, while the difference with respect to the Japanese yields is in the order of one percentage point.
High and rising levels of government debt in relation to GDP, and large government budget deficits are a second possible explanation. The final set of stylized fact refers to external imbalances. In sum, the stylized facts raise some doubt about the validity that the sovereign debt crisis has been driven primarily by the lack of fiscal discipline of the South. In fact, to select the problem economies by size of deficit or debt ratios is to pick out the wrong set of countries.
Two Interpretations
There are at least two interpretations of the sovereign debt crisis in the South of the euro area. The first is the lack of fiscal discipline; the second is the external imbalance and inadequate adjustment mechanisms operating in the EA. The two interpretations are not mutually exclusive; more on this below. However, while this evidence suggests that other variables could be at play, e.g., a
higher degree of risk aversion, the question is why would they act exclusively on the South and not on high-deficit, high-debt countries, such as Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom?
The answer comes from the alternative interpretation of the crisis. The shock of the financial crisis has exposed the fragility of the EA construction, which does not permit the South, burdened with external imbalances and rigid economies, to benefit from the fiscal equalization and bail-out commitments normally available to subnational governments of currency unions that are also fiscal unions. It is quite likely that the South may be too big to bail, an issue that does not apply to a country like Japan, for example, whose government is not too big to bail because it has a central bank willing to act as a lender of last resort. Under flexible or adjustable exchange rates, adjustments to a current account deficit occur via a combination of income and exchange rate changes. Under fixed exchange rates, the adjustment occurs by a flow of money from deficit to surplus countries and subsequent price and income adjustments. Should the central bank counteract this money flow with sterilization policies, a speculative attack will induce deficit countries to devalue and surplus countries to revalue their nominal exchange rates. In a monetary union like the Eurozone, NCBs can neither adopt sterilization policies nor adjust their nominal exchange rates. This does not imply, as we have seen, that the monetary union is immune from the risk of a speculative attack induced by persistent external imbalances in some of its member countries. To avoid such a risk, the adjustment to external imbalances must occur through internal revaluation in the surplus countries and/or internal devaluation of the deficit countries. In the EA, this means that the North must have higher incomes, prices and wages; or the South has to have lower incomes, prices and wages; or a combination of the two. This adjustment burden needs to be shared between surplus and deficit countries, with the predominant share of the burden falling on surplus countries when economic activity is slack and on deficit countries in an inflationary environment (Keynes 1943: 20; Mundell 1968, ch. 13) . But the North is not willing to reflate. Instead, it has imposed an internal devaluation on the South through a policy of fiscal austerity. Given that internal devaluation is difficult and takes a long time to implement, the market expresses its "fears" on the feasibility and sustainability of this strategy by raising risk premia on Southern government debt. These fears are further reinforced by the controversy over the Target2 balances.
Somewhat belatedly, the literature is beginning to recognize the importance of external imbalances in explaining the euro crisis. Monetary Union is currently experiencing a serious internal balance of payments 6 Notable exceptions, from different methodological approaches, are Blanchard (2006; 2007) and Brancaccio (2008) , who stress the role of balance-of-payments disequilibria and productivity differentials as root causes of the future Eurozone crisis.
crisis that is similar, in many important ways, to the crisis of the Bretton Woods System in the years prior to its demise."
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On the empirical side, the Bayesian approach followed by Maltritz (2011) points out the importance of the trade balance in explaining the yield spreads in the EMU. Barrios et al. (2009) In the following two sections we present a small model showing that these two alternative hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, and then some econometric results on the relative importance of fiscal fragility and external imbalances in explaining the broadening sovereign bond yields in the EA.
A General Framework
The objective of this section is to present a simple model that demonstrates how poor fundamentals can create a debt problem with or without fiscal responsibility.
The point of departure for this model is the fundamental identity in any open
economy: S -I = DEF + CA, where S = private saving, I = fixed investments, DEF = government budget deficit and CA = current account balance. This identity links external imbalances and private financing imbalances to the government's fiscal imbalance. It shows how imbalances on the right hand side can lead to a banking crisis in the private sector; and/or how an external imbalance, even in the absence of fiscal irresponsibility, can lead to an accumulation of public debt, capital outflows and a financial sector liquidity crisis, in which private debt is replaced by public debt.
For example, if a current-account deficit appears for any reason (CA < 0), then either the government has to run a budget deficit (DEF > 0), or private savings must fall relative to investment (S -I < 0) to restore equilibrium in the economy. But since private saving tends to rise and investment tends to fall in a recession (S -I > 0), the likely outcome is that the government budget deficit rises. In fact, if the private sector is carrying too much debt, it will be the first to deleverage in a downturn -creating a banking crisis because savings rise to reduce that debt. This causes a loss of liquidity in the banking system and a potential banking crisis, which leads to even larger fiscal deficits to rebalance economic activity and to replace savings in banks. At that point, excess private debt becomes excess public debt. Demand for assets/bonds in problem countries will collapse, especially in a currency union like the EA where asset sales can be sent to low-risk countries [Germany, Finland, Since both current accounts and portfolio balances affect exchange rates and rates of return, and are affected by them, they need to be modeled jointly. This is usually accomplished by assuming perfectly substitutable assets between countries and instantaneous but complete market adjustments. Uncovered interest rate parity can then be applied. However, given that we are dealing with a case where a country's net debt may become excessive, and may have to be curtailed, this approach is not suitable in a world of global imbalances and market distortions caused by sticky prices, fixed exchange rates, sudden stops, and a revealed preference for holding foreign reserves or foreign assets (i.e. safe haven or flight-to-quality effects). A more general approach is provided by Blanchard, Giavazzi and Sa (2005) , who build upon earlier models by Masson (1981) , Henderson and Rogoff (1983) , and Kouri (1983).
Blanchard et al. model current account and portfolio balances directly, and the adjustments between them. Their framework permits us to consider imperfect asset substitutability, and hence different asset preferences. It also allows us to examine the stability of the adjustment process in assets/debt under a common currency, sticky relative prices, and sudden stops in capital flows or inter-economy financing. The model has been extended by Hughes Hallett and Martinez Oliva (2012) to show the asset positions of different countries and valuation effects caused by financial flows.
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The formal model is presented and analyzed in the Appendix. Here we limit ourselves to a description of its main features and its implications. Our simple model considers two countries, home and foreign, linked to each other by an uncovered interest parity condition, current and expected real exchange rates (defined as the price of home goods relative to foreign goods). In the Eurozone, nominal exchange rates are fixed and changes in real exchange rates occur only through relative price levels. A country accumulates net foreign debt through interest payments on the beginning-of-the period debt and a new external imbalance flow, the latter a function of the real exchange rate and trade shocks. Investors' wealth is the difference between domestic assets and net foreign debt; the distribution of wealth between domestic and foreign assets is determined by interest rates and real exchange rates.
In equilibrium, there is a negative relationship between the real exchange rate and net debt in both the portfolio-balance relation and the current-account balance relation. A higher net foreign debt requires a lower exchange rate because the demand for domestic assets has fallen and a larger external surplus is needed to meet interest payments. To ensure stability in both the trade and capital markets, the sensitivity of the real exchange rate (E) to changes in net foreign debt (F) must be higher in the portfolio balance (PB=0) relation than in the current account balance (CA=0); see We start with a fixed exchange rate regime. At a point A, home's current account is in deficit and her net foreign debt is increasing. So the PB=0 line shifts to the right, and will continue to do so as long as the fixed exchange rate remains in place and relative prices remain sticky. The process of adjustment goes through an early stage of net foreign debt changes before valuation and exchange rate effects lead to a slide down the PB=0 line. But one never gets as far as A'' in the absence of real exchange rate depreciations. The process is not sustainable because home's debt increases without limit; default will eventually break the real exchange rate when the debt ratio can no longer be serviced, the economy goes into recession and prices fall.
When that happens, the economy adjusts down the PB=0 line until reaches C. But the longer E is maintained, the further the PB=0 line will have shifted, the greater the debt burden, the bigger the bust. To avoid these outcomes, home or foreign will have to bring a sudden capital stop and provide liquidity support; or they will have to adjust their real exchange rates; or foreign must accept an ever increasing accumulation of claims on home, such as unused foreign assets or Target2 promissory notes. In sum, debt is the main equilibrating force until countries are forced to adjust the real exchange rate and competitiveness.
We move next to a flexible exchange rate regime. At B, home's current account is in deficit and her net foreign debt is increasing. A saddle path to a new equilibrium is determined by the interplay of a faster adjusting debt, and hence upward pressure on the current account deficit; and a slower adjusting trade balance, hence downward pressure on the current-account deficit. If the former dominates, one does not get back to the 0 CA = line; instead one moves down a parallel line above it until one gets close to the PB = 0 line (assuming that the slower moving trade adjustments allows to catch up with movements in the portfolio balance). Eventually at PB=0, F will be moving slower than the trade balance and it becomes possible to slide down the portfolio balance line to the new equilibrium at C. If the trade balance is sensitive to the exchange rate (i.e., the Marshall-Lerner conditions are satisfied), the pressure to move down to the current account line will be large relative to the changes in debt and we will catch up with the shifts in C. However, the Marshall-Lerner conditions are often not satisfied, especially in the short run when J-curve effects are operative. In the long term, the trade deficit may become sufficiently sensitive to real exchange rate depreciations the economy to approach the CA=0 line. If so, E will jump to the saddle path and settle at C where & F = 0 and PB=0 stops moving. In sum, the danger is that corrections to trade imbalances may never be large enough, rapid enough, or strong enough to balance the current account and stop the debt escalation.
Implications
The model sketched above has several implications for the empirical work that follows. First, both interpretations of the debt crisis -fiscal irresponsibility and external imbalances -are not mutually exclusive and yield comparable implications, especially in the short run.
In the long run, however, the external imbalance interpretation has more explanatory power: factors such as losses of competitiveness, sticky real exchange rates, persistent trade deficits, sudden stops in capital flows, and vanishing liquidity can account for a debt crisis independently of fiscal irresponsibility; whereas irresponsible fiscal policies can be overcome when the fundamentals are strong (e.g., the pre-2005 period). Second, debt sustainability requires higher debt levels to be matched by depreciating real exchange rates; and that the indicators of debt sustainability, such as yields on government securities relative to a safe asset, are more sensitive to portfolio factors and financing flows than to the trade balance.
Third, the relative speeds of adjustments in asset portfolios and trade deficits play a critical role in the debt crisis: debt adjustment (or debt indicators) should react stronger and faster to the level of debt than to current-account deficits (or their underlying determinants). Fourth, whether we can reach an equilibrium position with sticky real exchange rates and financing stops is an empirical matter. The model shows that the longer the fundamentals remain out of balance, the larger are the crash and the adjustment process in the end. Lastly, the loss of market liquidity (a sudden stop in F, which manifests itself in larger bid-ask spreads in the securities market) and inflexible real exchange rates render adjustment to a new equilibrium much more difficult, if not impossible.
In the next section, we will test some of the implications of the two interpretations of the debt crisis. lax fiscal policy, and hence default risk to the extent that they undermine public debt sustainability. Debt sustainability is also weakened by high values of existing public debt: small changes in interest rates exert large changes in interest payments on debt.
Therefore, financial markets start demanding higher risk premia when public debts are perceived to be "too high." The emergence of higher risk premia may, in turn, trigger a vicious cycle of rising interest expenditures and growth-reducing fiscal austerity undertaken during periods of slow or negative economic growth (Perotti 2012) .
We have shown that some countries in the South -e.g., Spain -had better fiscal positions than Germany before the onset of the crisis and have argued that the roots of the crisis are deeper than fiscal profligacy. Our focus has been on external imbalances instead and the fragility of the EA in the absence of a smooth adjustment mechanism for resolving these imbalances (see Section 3 above). The vector Hagen (2010) . The small number of observations and, especially, the limited number of countries prevents us from using a more complete dynamic specification and GMM estimates (Arellano and Bond 1991) , which are unsuited to samples like ours (Bond 2002). Our main results, however, are confirmed using a standard fixed effect model and other estimators used to model the autocorrelation of the residuals. Results are also robust to the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable to take into account its high persistence. 2005; so we re-estimate the first two columns of Table 4 over the shorter sub-sample using our measure of foreign borrowing. Results are reported in Table 5 . The presence of Liabilities to German banks does not alter the effect of the main variables of the model on spread (column 1); nor does it make the coefficient of Trade balance statistically significant (column 2). Instead, the Liabilities to German banks coefficient is negative and statistically significant; a result that is consistent with the hypothesis that credit retrenchment is positively associated with a surge in spreads (column 3). This effect is robust, but numerically small, even when we add the Post 2010 dummy and its interaction terms with Greece and PIIS (column 4).
Main results

Fiscal fragility, external imbalances, or both?
The results reported in Tables 4 and 5 In sum, the results point to the greater importance of market liquidity in times of uncertainty (as in Beber et al. 2009 ) and a shift from a fiscal crisis to a balance-ofpayment crisis, which is grounded in labor productivity differences between the North and the South.
Testing for structural breaks
The empirical work so far assumes that the coefficient estimates remain the same over time. However, regression results reported in Table 4 (column 5) and Table 5 (column 4) indicate that the model itself is not able to fully explain the Eurozone crisis since 2010. The Post 2010 dummy and the interaction terms are statistically significant and they greatly increase the R-squared of the regression. Hence, we test for the presence of a structural break around 2010. 16 Table 7 shows the results for the two main specifications, one for the full sample and one for the subsample including foreign borrowing by German banks. In both cases, the Chow test confirms that there is a structural break in the wake of the Eurozone crisis: the effect on the explanatory variables is significantly different across the pre-2010 and the post-2010 samples, as
shown by the t-tests on the equality of coefficients.
Specifically, Global Risk Aversion has the standard positive coefficient in the pre-crisis period, but turns negative in the midst of the Eurozone crisis, further confirming the regional dimension of the crisis. On the whole, the role of fiscal variables and external imbalances is magnified during the crisis, while the effect of market liquidity is much lower than in the pre-2010 period, consistent with evidence recently provided by Favero and Missale (2012) on default risk as the main driver of sovereign yields. Finally, it is worth stressing that the effect of differences in the growth of labor productivity and foreign borrowing are significant in the crisis period only, providing additional evidence in favor of the external imbalance interpretation of the sovereign debt crisis.
Conclusions
This paper has presented two views of the European sovereign debt crisis. The first is that the South of the euro zone has been fiscally irresponsible, and has failed to implement necessary supply-side policies such as liberalizing labor markets and the market for services. This interpretation has won official recognition and represents the prevailing wisdom in the eurozone. It has led to an austerity program aimed at reducing government budget deficits and government debt-to-GDP ratios in the South, haircuts on holders of government debt should member countries receive financial assistance from the European Union or to restructure their public debt, and to a new Fiscal Compact that reinforces the provisions of the existing Stability and Growth Pact.
The second view is that Germany and France, but primarily Germany, have failed to understand the nature of the sovereign debt crisis. Within the Eurozone, the North has enjoyed large current-account surpluses while the South has accumulated large current-account deficits, suggesting that the euro is too weak for the North and too strong for the South. Since exchange rates are "permanently" fixed within the Eurozone and given that the level of economic activity is historically low in the South, the burden of adjusting external imbalances should fall primarily on the North through an expansion of aggregate demand rather than forcing the South to curtail its demand. The austerity program imposed on the South implies a reduction of income that is bound to counteract the effects of austerity on budget deficits and debt ratios. Furthermore, an important reason for the crisis is that the South cannot benefit from the insurance mechanism that operates in other fiscal unions, which redirects public funds from above-average income regions to below-average income regions. The sovereign debt default mechanism, in fact, reflects the absence of this solidarity, and aggravates the risk of a euro implosion.
These two views are not inconsistent with one another. The first stresses the need for fiscal correction, although not necessarily in the short term. The second recognizes the importance of the long-run fiscal adjustment but identifies the source of the sovereign debt crisis in inadequate adjustments in competiveness and between surplus and deficit countries within the union. As presently constituted, the euro area lacks two important safety valves: the transfer union and an iron-clad guarantee that national central banks have unlimited access to credit in the settlement of intra-euro area payments.
The stylized facts in Section 2, and the model presented in Section 4, raise some doubts about the interpretation that debt crisis is driven only or primarily by fiscal irresponsibility in the South. The comparison of the correlation between debt levels, primary balances and yield spreads in southern European countries and in the UK, US and Japan suggest that fiscal fundamentals alone are not enough to explain sovereign risk. Even within the euro area, some southern countries had sounder fiscal positions than Germany before the onset of the crisis. By contrast, there is a deep divide between the external surpluses of the North and the external deficits of the South. The North has benefited from low unit labor cost growth and a real exchange rate depreciations relative to the South. This trend has been mirrored by capital outflows from the North-especially from German banks-to the South. These flows were used to finance domestic consumption and a boom in the residential sector rather than productive investments, spreading the seeds of the sovereign debt crisis.
The empirical analysis of the determinants of government bond yield spreads suggests that both interpretations can provide useful insights on the roots of the current sovereign crisis. Fiscal fragility and external imbalances explain a significant share of the widening spreads since the onset of the global financial crisis. However, differences in labor productivity growth rates between the North and the South assume a more central role since the Greek crisis erupted in 2010.
APPENDIX: A Model of Current Account and Portfolio Balances
Consider a home country, say Spain, and foreign country, say Germany (denoted with a "*"), which are linked by the uncovered interest parity condition, 1
(1 ) (1 *) / e r r E E + + = +
( 1) where r and r* are the home and foreign rates of interest respectively, E is the real exchange rate (defined as the price of home goods relative to foreign goods), and 1 e E + is the real exchange rate expected next period. Thus
where e is the nominal exchange rate defined as the domestic currency price of foreign currency (e.g., dollars per euro if the US is the home country). In the specific case of Spain and Germany, e = 1. The home country accumulates net foreign debt according to:
where F is the net debt denominated in the home currency (the amount of domestic currency needed to pay them off) 17 . D(E,z) is the trade deficit, which is a positive function of the real exchange rate. z is a shift variable describing the impact of a trade shock, a change in preference for home goods, or other changes in spending or the pattern of spending on those goods.
To allow for imperfect substitutability between national assets, let W be the total wealth of home investors, X the total stock of home's assets, and F net debt position of the home economy (all in real terms). Thus:
Wealth of foreign investors, in home's currency, is
The expected real rate of return from holding home's assets relative to foreign's is
Home investors place a share α in home securities and 1-α in foreign assets; and α* and 1-α* are the corresponding shares of foreign investors. We assume that α is increasing in the relative rates of return on home assets, e R , and in s, defined as the preference for holding domestic assets including any home bias, and safe haven effects. Symmetrically, α* is decreasing in those two factors. If home biases dominate the asset market, then * 1.
α α + > Equilibrium in the market for home's assets, and hence foreign's assets, is given by the following portfolio balance (PB) equation:
Unlike in perfect substitutability, the distribution of wealth between home and foreign is independent of shifts in the trade or current account balances (i.e. z). Instead the real exchange rate E, relative rates of return e R , and asset preferences s, all of which 17 We do not distinguish home's foreign and domestic held debt since no Eurozone country can use monetary policy to inflate its debt away. In that sense, all debt is "foreign".
affect α, determine and are determined by the distribution of wealth holdings. Nevertheless, trade and current account balances do lead to changes in F, and hence to changes in the real exchange rate:
The portfolio balance relation is nonlinear in E-F space and is downward sloping as long as home biases persist * 1 α α + > . Under these conditions, higher debt at home requires a lower exchange rate (because the demand for home assets has fallen, a larger trade surplus is needed to meet interest payments); and real exchange rates respond less to current-account imbalances than to changes in portfolio preferences and the distribution of wealth.
If home and foreign goods are imperfect substitutes, and the trade balance D behaves as in (3), then home's net debt in the next period will be:
That is foreign ownership of home assets (plus interest), less the value of home owned foreign assets plus interest, plus the next trade deficit. Rewriting with (4), (5) and (6):
This is the current-account balance (CA) relation since 1 1 .
CA D rF
The middle term reflects the changing evaluation of home-owned foreign assets due to differing rates of return (including risk premia). Equation (10) contains, not only the CA balance, but also the cumulative effect of "discretionary" trade-balance choices. Policymakers have little control over F except by providing liquidity or loans in the face of sudden stops in capital or financing flows (i.e. when F is held constant), except through future trade balances and growth. The slope of the CA relation, in E-F space in the current period, is:
which depends on the size of the domestic asset base: a large asset base, X > F, means a shallow slope, a small asset base a steep slope. This is the normal state of affairs since, if F rises, it requires E to fall to create a move towards a trade surplus at home in order to generate sufficient extra revenues to pay for the higher net debt -the more so the smaller is the asset base relative to foreign ownership of domestic assets. That implies (11) will have to be negative. The following condition, that the portfolio balance line is steeper than the CA relation, must be satisfied to ensure stability in both the trade and capital markets:
Equation (12) is satisfied if:
• X >> F or F < 0. This represents an economy with a large domestic asset base and is self-sufficient in investment and funding; on the contrary, stability is at risk if the economy is heavily dependent on foreign debt for funding.
• If E is low and expected to remain low; or X* is large. This is generally a matter of policy stance; as in Germany in the EA, or China beyond. Table 4 for sources.
36
. Global risk aversion and sovereign risk in the euro area gn Risk Factor is the first principal component of the sovereign yield spreads to 10 years German bunds of EMU countries. The Global Risk aversion is calculated as the first principal components of the volatility index of the OEX market, the effective long-term yields on AAA corporate bonds and on US, and the volatility of the euro-yen 3-months exchange rate. Daily is the first principal component of the sovereign yield spreads to 10-is calculated as the first principal term yields on AAA-and months exchange rate. Daily Figure 6 . Liquidity in the euro area sovereign 10 Notes: Liquidity in the secondary sovereign bond markets is measured by the opposite of the bid spread. See Table 4 for details and sources.
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. Liquidity in the euro area sovereign 10-year bond markets secondary sovereign bond markets is measured by the opposite of the bid spread. See Table 4 for details and sources. year bond markets secondary sovereign bond markets is measured by the opposite of the bid-ask estimates for linear cross-sectional time-series models. The disturbances are assumed heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated across panels. Within panels, there is first-order autocorrelation and the coefficient of the AR(1) process is specific to each panel. The associated robust standard errors are reported in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. A constant and nine country dummies are included but not showed. Notes: The table reports the regression coefficients of Panel-Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) estimates for linear cross-sectional time-series models. The disturbances are assumed heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated across panels. Within panels, there is first-order autocorrelation and the coefficient of the AR(1) process is specific to each panel. The associated robust standard errors are reported in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. A constant and nine country dummies are included but not showed. Notes: The table reports the estimated contribution of each explanatory variable to the 10-years government bond spreads to German bunds, based on actual changes of explanatory variables over different sample periods. Calculations are based on the coefficients reported in Table 5 (columns 3 and 4). The grey line indicates variables whose coefficients are not statistically significant in the regression. Notes: The table reports the regression coefficients of Panel-Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) estimates for linear cross-sectional time-series models. The disturbances are assumed heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated across panels. Within panels, there is first-order autocorrelation and the coefficient of the AR(1) process is specific to each panel. The associated robust standard errors are reported in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The base model refers to the specification reported in column 1 of Table 2 , while the model including bank loans refers to the specification reported in column 3 of Table 3 . Each explanatory variable is interacted with the Post 2010 dummy in order to have separate coefficients for the pre-and the post-2010 periods, reported in columns (1)- (4) and (2)- (5), respectively. The t-tests and the associated p-values for equality of coefficients across the two sub-periods are reported in columns (3) and (6). The Chow tests for the presence of a structural break between pre-and post-2010 are reported at the bottom of the Table. A constant, the Post 2010 dummy, and nine country dummies (each one interacted with the Post 2010 dummy) are included in both specifications but not showed.
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